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COMMENTS
Drilling When the Well Goes Dry: The Oklahoma
Corporation Commission & the Police Power Exception to
the Automatic Stay
Introduction
The oil and gas industry is, for all intents and purposes, the lifeblood of
the Oklahoma economy. Everywhere you turn, you see another oil pump.
Some bob up and down as they draw the “cash crop” of Oklahoma from the
shale formations thousands of feet below. Others appear lifeless and have
not moved in years. You see them beside the interstate, next to family
farms, in the middle of empty fields, and even in and around the state’s
largest cities. Nearly every facet of life in Oklahoma is in some way
affected by the oil and gas industry. The energy industry in Oklahoma
employs the state’s largest workforce—nearly 200,000 people.1 The
population increase in the state is directly tied to the success of the oil
industry.2 Even the state’s tallest building and focal point of the downtown
Oklahoma City skyline, the Devon Energy Center, is home to thousands of
oil and gas industry employees.3 Furthermore, the price of a barrel of oil
drastically affects the state’s gross domestic product,4 funding for
education,5 and even charitable giving.6
Given the importance of oil and natural gas to the state, it should come as
no surprise that the sharp drop in oil prices in 2014 hit Oklahoma’s
economy particularly hard, especially in the job market.7 With the layoffs
1. Energy, OKLA. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://stateofsuccess.com/industries/energy
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
2. MARK C. SNEAD & AMY A. JONES, STATE CHAMBER OF OKLA. RESEARCH FOUND.,
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY ON OKLAHOMA 48 (Sept. 2016),
http://www.okstatechamber.com/files/OK%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Tax%20Policy%2020
16%20Final.pdf.
3. DEVON ENERGY CENTER, http://devonenergycenter.net (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
4. See SNEAD & JONES, supra note 2, at 3.
5. Luc Cohen & Joshua Schneyer, Taxing Lessons: When the Oil Boom Went Bust,
Oklahoma Protected Drillers and Squeezed Schools, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (May 17, 2016,
1:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-oklahoma-bust.
6. Steve Lackmeyer & Adam Wilmoth, Oklahoma City Shares Pain Being Felt as
Spending Cuts and Layoffs Continue at Chesapeake Energy, OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 29, 2015,
12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/5450268.
7. See Associated Press, Low Oil Prices Force 2 Oklahoma Companies to Cut Jobs,
FUEL FIX (Mar. 27, 2015), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2015/03/27/low-oil-prices-force-2-
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came the inability of oil companies across North America to pay off their
many creditors: since the beginning of 2015, 134 exploration and
production (E&P) companies in North America filed for bankruptcy, with
approximately $79.8 billion in cumulative debt.8 In 2016 alone, seventy
E&P companies filed bankruptcy with $56.8 billion in cumulative debt.9 To
make matters worse, E&P companies have not borne the hardship alone:
155 oilfield service companies ($43.6 billion in cumulative debt)10 and
twenty-one midstream companies ($20.3 billion in cumulative debt) have
also filed for bankruptcy since 2015.11
In addition to the dramatic impact on the state’s economy, bankruptcies
of E&P companies in Oklahoma could have an interesting effect on the
oklahoma-companies-to-cut-jobs (Worthington Industries and Samson Resource Co.
layoffs); Keaton Fox, Another OKC-Based Oil and Gas Company Announces Layoffs, FOX
25 (Feb. 25, 2016), http://okcfox.com/news/local/another-okc-based-oil-and-gas-companyannounces-layoffs (Kimray, Inc., layoffs); Brian Hardzinski, Layoffs Coming for Oklahoma
City-Based Devon Energy, KGOU (Jan. 21, 2016), http://kgou.org/post/layoffs-comingoklahoma-city-based-devon-energy; Zak Patterson, Chesapeake Energy Lays Off 562
Oklahoma City Employees Tuesday, KOCO NEWS 5 (Sept. 29, 2015, 10:28 PM),
http://www.koco.com/article/chesapeake-energy-lays-off-562-oklahoma-city-employeestuesday/4306186; Rod Walton, Oil Bust Hits Home: Apache Corp., Others Cutting Jobs in
Tulsa Area, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 17, 2015, http://www.tulsaworld.com/business/energy/oilbust-hits-home-apache-corp-others-cutting-jobs-in/article_fccc8e3d-99e2-582b-8b3509dd99346d15.html; Adam Wilmoth, Energy Company Announces Layoffs in Oklahoma
City, OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 26, 2014), http://newsok.com/article/5345671 (HighMount
Exploration and Production LLC layoffs). The economic impact of the energy industry
layoffs has also affected other Oklahoma industries. Lacie Lowry, Oil Field Cuts, Layoffs
Trickling Down to Other Industries, NEWS 9 (Oct. 19, 2015 5:45 PM), http://www.news9.
com/story/30300350/oil-field-cuts-layoffs-trickling-down-to-other-industries.
8. HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP, OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR 2 (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/energy_bankruptcy_reports/2017/2017_oil_patc
h_monitor_20171031.ashx [hereinafter OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR]. This number
reflects only the bankruptcies of E&P companies and does not include midstream companies
or oilfield service companies. Haynes and Boone updates its Oil Patch Bankruptcy Monitor
fairly regularly, and the number of bankrupt E&P companies and their cumulative debt will
frequently change.
9. Id. at 8–9.
10. HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP, OILFIELD SERVICES BANKRUPTCY TRACKER 2 (Oct. 31,
2017), http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/energy_bankruptcy_reports/2017/2017_
ofs_bankruptcy_tracker_20171031.ashx. Like the Oil Patch Bankruptcy Monitor, Haynes
and Boone frequently updates its Oilfield Services Bankruptcy Tracker.
11. HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP, MIDSTREAM REPORT 2 (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.
haynesboone.com/~/media/files/energy_bankruptcy_reports/2017/2017_midstream%20repor
t_20171031.ashx. Like the Oil Patch Bankruptcy Monitor, Haynes and Boone frequently
updates its Midstream Report.
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workings of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (“Corporation
Commission”).12 Specifically, bankruptcy could impact the processes by
which E&P companies (and even individual working interest owners)
obtain permission to drill wells in Oklahoma. There are over 3000 oil well
operators registered with the Corporation Commission.13 Of those
operators, at least thirteen major E&P companies have filed for bankruptcy
since 2015: Sabine Oil & Gas, Continental Exploration, Samson Resources,
Osage Exploration and Development, New Source Energy Partners,
Postrock Energy, Midstates Petroleum, Chaparral Energy, Linn Energy,
Penn Virginia, Breitburn Operating, SandRidge Energy, and Atlas Resource
Partners.14 The safe haven of bankruptcy offers these debtors protections
from existing and would-be creditors, chiefly the § 362(a) automatic stay.15
The automatic stay shields a debtor in bankruptcy from the initiation or
continuation of judicial proceedings brought against the debtor.16 There are,
however, exceptions to the automatic stay.17 Among those exceptions is the
“police power exception.”18 The police power exception allows
governmental units to exercise their police and regulatory authority—under
certain circumstances—despite the protection of the automatic stay.19 The
question becomes: How does this exception to the automatic stay impact
the conservation proceedings of the Corporation Commission?
The Corporation Commission recently considered this question as it
related to Linn Energy, an E&P company based in Houston, Texas, with

12. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission is discussed infra Part I.
13. See generally OKLA. CORP. COMM’N, OPERATOR’S DIRECTORY (Dec. 15, 2017) (on
file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
14. Compare id. at 29 (Atlas Resources), id. at 70 (Breitburn Operating), id. at 103
(Chaparral Energy), id. at 126 (Continental Exploration), id. at 318 (Linn Energy), id. at 351
(Midstates Petroleum), id. at 406 (Penn Virginia), id. at 473 (Sabine Oil & Gas), id. at 476
(Samson Resources), and id. at 477 (SandRidge Energy), with OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY
MONITOR, supra note 8, at 7–9. While not listed in the Operator’s Directory, both Postrock
Energy and Osage Exploration and Development filed their respective bankruptcies in the
Western District of Oklahoma. OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR, supra note 8, at 8.
Following its liquidation in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, New Source Energy Partners is no
longer listed in the Operator’s Directory. Adam Wilmoth, New Source Energy Declares
Bankruptcy, OKLAHOMAN (March 18, 2016), http://newsok.com/article/5485645.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
16. Id. § 362(a)(1).
17. See generally id. § 362(b).
18. Id. § 362(b)(4).
19. Id.
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operations in Oklahoma.20 Mid-Continent II, LLC, a subsidiary of Linn
Energy, was serving as the operator of wells in two different established
spacing units when Linn Energy filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
on May 11, 2016.21 Less than a month later, Gaedeke Oil & Gas Operating,
LLC, owner of more than fifty percent of the working interest in each unit,
asked the Corporation Commission to modify or vacate the pooling orders
and name Gaedeke the operator of the wells instead of Linn Energy. 22 At
the hearing for Gaedeke’s motion on June 27, 2016, the Administrative
Law Judge raised a concern about the impact of the automatic stay on the
proceedings.23 Gaedeke argued the proceeding should continue despite the
automatic stay because of the police power exception.24 Judge Decker
agreed,25 and the Commissioners upheld the decision, finding that the
proceeding to re-open the pooling order fell within the police power
exception.26
Considering the Corporation Commission’s decision that pooling
proceedings should be excepted from the automatic stay, it is important for
Oklahoma practitioners to understand how the police power exception and
the automatic stay function. Part I of this Comment discusses forced
poolings, the conservation proceeding before the Corporation Commission
arguably most impacted by the automatic stay and the police power
exception. Part II explores the purpose and elements of the automatic stay
and its role as protector of the bankruptcy estate. Part III explores the two
20. Restructuring Information, LINN ENERGY, http://www.linnenergy.com/restructuring
(last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
21. See generally Linn Energy Pooling Order, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, Cause CD No.
201506167-T/O (filed May 16, 2016), http://imaging.occeweb.com/AP/Orders/occ5283
094.pdf.
22. Gaedeke’s Motion to Vacate Order No. 652804 and to Reopen Cause, Okla. Corp.
Comm’n, Cause CD No. 201506167-T/O (filed June 1, 2016), http://imaging.occeweb.com/
AP/CaseFiles/occ5285805.pdf.
23. Oral Report of the Administrative Law Judge in Response to Motions to Vacate
Orders and to Reopen Causes, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, Cause CD Nos. 201506166-T/O &
201506167-T/O (filed June 27, 2016), http://imaging.occeweb.com/AP/CaseFiles/occ529
1648.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Oral Appeal of the Administrative Law Judge’s Ruling in Response to Motions to
Vacate Orders and to Reopen Causes, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, Cause CD Nos. 201506166-T/O
& 201506167-T/O (filed July 22, 2016), http://imaging.occeweb.com/AP/CaseFiles/
occ5297809.pdf.
26. Order Granting Motion to Reopen and Order Denying Motion to Vacate Orders
652804 and 653111, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, Cause CD Nos. 201506166-T/O & 201506167T/O (filed Jan. 18, 2017), http://imaging.occeweb.com/AP/Orders/occ5343991.pdf.
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tests used to determine whether a proceeding meets the police power
exception in the context of three recent Fifth and Tenth Circuit cases. Part
IV draws comparisons between groups of cases applying the police power
exception and forced poolings. These cases come from not only the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, but also the Fifth Circuit because the vast
majority of E&P bankruptcies have been filed in Texas.27 An understanding
of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, the automatic stay, and the
police power exception leads to the logical conclusion that a forced pooling
should be excepted from the automatic stay.
I. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission was created by the Oklahoma
Constitution.28 By statute, the Corporation Commission is empowered to
“establish an Oil and Gas Department under the jurisdiction and supervision
of the Corporation Commission.”29 The Oil and Gas Department has
“exclusive jurisdiction, power, and authority”30 over nearly every facet of
oil and gas operations in Oklahoma, including “the conservation of oil and
gas,”31 and “the exploration, drilling, development, producing or processing
for oil and gas on the lease site.”32
Everything the Oil and Gas Division does for the conservation of oil and
gas it does in an effort to further public policies: eliminating waste,
maximizing hydrocarbon recovery, protecting the correlative rights of all
owners, and preventing pollution.33 One way the Corporation Commission
seeks to further its public policy goals is through forced poolings.34 The
forced pooling statute provides that when working interest owners within an
established spacing unit have not, will not, or cannot come to an agreement
about how, where, or whether to drill a well in the unit, the Corporation
Commission may “require such owners to pool and develop their lands in
the spacing unit as a unit.”35 Before exploring how the police power
exception interacts with a forced pooling, it is first necessary to understand
forced poolings themselves. This section attempts to explain the events
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR, supra note 8, at 5.
OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 15.
17 OKLA. STAT. § 51 (2011).
Id. § 52.A.1.
Id. § 52.A.1.a.
Id. § 52.A.1.c.
OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-1-1 (2016).
52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (2011).
Id.
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leading up to a forced pooling, the policy behind forced poolings, and the
procedure for obtaining a forced pooling.
A. Forced Poolings: When?
Before a working interest owner can apply for a pooling order, the tract
of land to be developed must be within an established spacing unit.36 In
order to prevent the waste of oil and gas and to protect the correlative rights
of mineral interest owners, the Corporation Commission has the power to
establish “well spacing and drilling units . . . covering any common source
of supply.”37 A spacing order must be issued pursuant to title 52, section
87.1(a) of the Oklahoma Statutes to create the established spacing unit.38 In
order to create a spacing unit, a “person owning an interest in the minerals”
or owning “the right to drill a well for oil or gas” within the common source
of supply can petition the Corporation Commission to create a “unit.”39
Before the spacing hearing, notice must be given by publication in a
newspaper in Oklahoma County and by publication in a newspaper in any
county in which the lands in the petition are situated.40 The order
establishing the spacing unit must include: (1) the outside boundaries of the
unit; (2) the size, form, and shape of the unit; (3) the drilling pattern; and
(4) the location of the permitted well.41 After a spacing order is entered,
only one well may be drilled on the unit42 and must be drilled in the
location specified by the Corporation Commission (generally, the center of
the unit).43
Once a unit is created, any owner of an undivided working interest in the
unit has the right to drill for, produce, and sell oil and gas drawn from the
unit.44 But the Corporation Commission requires that every working interest
owner must agree to develop the land before drilling can commence. 45
Owners in the unit have the option to “validly pool their interest and
develop their lands” together.46 With a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA)47
36. Id.
37. Id. § 87.1(a).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 87.1(c).
42. Id.
43. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-1-24(a) (2016).
44. See Charles Nesbitt, A Primer on Forced Pooling of Oil and Gas Interests in
Oklahoma, 50 OKLA. B.J. 648, 648 (1979).
45. Id.
46. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (2011).
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entered into by every working interest owner, the designated well operator
can apply for a “Permit to Drill” with the Conservation Division of the
Corporation Commission without needing to apply for a pooling order.48 A
pooling order becomes necessary, however, when, for any reason, the
owners in a unit have not, will not, or cannot enter into a JOA.49
B. Forced Poolings: Why?
There are several reasons why a Pooling Order may be necessary. First,
it is possible that the owners in a unit simply do not know who owns each
working interest in the unit. This could mean the chain of title for one of the
tracts within the unit stopped, or, perhaps, the other working interest owners
cannot locate a final working interest owner. It could also be that one of the
working interest owners, for one reason or another, does not want to drill a
well in the unit. Finally, there could be a scenario in which every working
interest owner has agreed to drill a well, but they cannot agree on a
designated operator or how to drill the well (i.e., horizontally or vertically).
In any event, without securing the consent of every working interest owner
(all of whom are necessary to enter into a JOA), none of the working
interest owners in the unit would be able to drill a well without a Pooling
Order from the Corporation Commission.
The most apparent purpose of a forced pooling is to fulfill the
Corporation Commission’s policy goals: preventing waste, maximizing
recovery, and protecting correlative rights.50 A forced pooling in a
designated spacing unit prevents waste by ensuring only one well is drilled
in a unit, thus limiting the number of wells drilled into each formation.
Without the coordination of spacing and pooling, several working interest
owners could, theoretically, drill multiple wells into the same formation.
Such uncoordinated activity can result in repercussions contrary to the
Corporation Commission’s policy goals, including decreased rates of

47. A JOA is the contractual framework for a Joint Venture—when two or more
working interest owners agree to undertake exploration and production of hydrocarbons.
Muhammad Waqas, History and Development of JOAs in the Oil and Gas Industry, OIL &
GAS FIN. J. (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-11/issue-10/features/
joint-operating-agreements.html. A standard JOA will designate a well-operator, detail the
scope of the agreement, and allocate the expenses and profits shared by each party. Id.
Additionally, a JOA will contain standard contract provisions such as sections concerning
duration, default, dispute resolution, and withdrawal. Id.
48. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-1(a)(1) (2016).
49. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e).
50. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-1-1.
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recovery, production in excess of pipeline transport capacity, and, possibly,
pollution.51
Forced poolings maximize recovery by ensuring any willing working
interest owner in an established spacing unit has the ability to drill a well
over the protests of any “holdout” working interest owners.52 Without the
forced pooling mechanism, a single, non-consenting working interest owner
could completely thwart any (and every) attempt to drill within a designated
spacing unit. The Corporation Commission prefers not to limit the recovery
of hydrocarbons based on a single party’s misgivings, and forced poolings
prevent that very issue. Forced poolings create an easier avenue for a
working interest owner to drill in a spacing unit without a JOA. More
drilling inherently means more hydrocarbon recovery.
While a forced pooling clearly benefits working interest owners who
want to drill, a forced pooling also seeks to protect the correlative rights of
all working interest owners in a spacing unit, including those opposed to
drilling within the unit. The non-consenting working interest owner is
offered a choice: he can participate in the drilling efforts, sharing his
proportionate costs and keeping his share of the profits; or he can receive a
“bonus,” foregoing his right to participate in drilling the well.53 By giving
up his right to financial participation in the cost (and risk) of the intended
well, the non-participating owner surrenders his working interest but retains
his one-eighth royalty interest in the mineral estate.54 The bonus given to a
non-participating owner is usually cash, an excess royalty interest, or some
combination thereof, although the excess royalty interest is most common. 55
The value of the bonus is supposed to equal the value of an oil and gas lease
had the parties entered into the lease voluntarily.56 A forced pooling
accounts for every working interest owner, making sure each non-

51. Oklahoma Corporation Commission History, OKLA. CORP. COMMISSION,
http://www.occeweb.com/Comm/commissionhist.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2017). In fact,
this very issue led to the regulation of oil and gas by the Corporation Commission in the first
place. Id.
52. There are, of course, necessary procedural steps a prospective well operator must
take before he can pool his fellow working interest owners. One such step is a hearing where
his fellow co-tenants can object to the forced pooling. These procedures are discussed infra
Section I.C.
53. Nesbitt, supra note 44, at 649.
54. Id. Oklahoma statutorily defines a mineral estate as comprised of seven-eighths
working interest and one-eighth royalty interest. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e).
55. Nesbitt, supra note 44, at 650–51.
56. Id. at 650.
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participating or non-consenting owner receives his fair share, and protects
the correlative rights of the working interest owners.
C. Forced Poolings: How?
The Corporation Commission has extensive rules and procedures that a
would-be well operator must follow to obtain a pooling order.57 To begin a
pooling proceeding, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission Rules of
Practice require a detailed application to the Corporation Commission.58
The application must identify each of the parties (the applicant and each
working interest owner), set forth the facts (location of the unit, projected
cost of the well, and others), provide the legal authority for the application
(title 52, section 87.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes), and state the relief sought
(a pooling order).59 The applicant must also present a notice of hearing to
be served with the application detailing the time, date, and place of the
hearing, the nature of the hearing, the formations affected by the potential
pooling, and the applicant’s contact information.60 Additionally, the notice
must be published at least fifteen days before the hearing in a newspaper in
Oklahoma County and “in each county in which the lands embraced in the
application are located.”61
Beyond the general application requirements, a pooling applicant is also
required to include a statement showing that the applicant “exercised due
diligence to locate each respondent,” and that the working interest owners
already attempted to reach an agreement through a JOA.62 Furthermore, the
notice of hearing and application must be served on each working interest
owner within the drilling and spacing unit no less than fifteen days prior to
the hearing (although service can be by “restricted mail”).63 Hearings are
typically held in the courtrooms in the Corporation Commission’s principal
office in Oklahoma City.64 A vast majority of the conservation applications
(including pooling applications) are uncontested, but a hearing takes place
nonetheless, albeit quickly.65 Any contested case is heard by an
57. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission Rules of Practice are codified at OKLA.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 165:5-1-1 to 5-27-14 (2016).
58. Id. § 165:5-7-1.
59. Id. § 165:5-7-1(d).
60. Id. § 165:5-7-1(j), (l).
61. Id. § 165:5-7-1(n)(2).
62. Id. § 165:5-7-7(a).
63. Id. § 165:5-7-7(b).
64. Id. § 165:5-13-1(a).
65. Nesbitt, supra note 44, at 656. Hearings are governed by OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §
165:5-13-3.
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Administrative Law Judge who prepares a written report to send to each
party.66 After ten days, the Corporation Commission enters the pooling
order.67
Given the growing frequency with which oil companies in the region are
declaring bankruptcy, it is necessary to understand the procedures an E&P
company must follow to drill a well in Oklahoma. A forced pooling affects
the rights owned in a mineral estate and even the value of the mineral estate
itself. As a judicial proceeding affecting a valuable property right that
would enter the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition,68
forced poolings provide a lens through which to analyze both the automatic
stay and the police power exception.
II. The Automatic Stay
“The automatic stay bars anyone from taking action to recover a debt
then owing by the debtor or acting to affect property of the debtor or the
estate or in the possession of the estate.”69 The stay serves to protect both
creditors and debtors.70 For creditors, the automatic stay ensures that the
goal of bankruptcy—equal treatment among creditors—is achieved by
preventing a “chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor’s assets in a
variety of uncoordinated proceedings in different courts.”71 The automatic
stay, coupled with the jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy court by 28
U.S.C. § 157(a),72 “assures creditors that the debtor’s other creditors are not
racing to various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the

66. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:5-13-4(a)-(b).
67. Id. § 165:5-13-4(c).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012).
69. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.05[1] (16th ed. 2013).
70. Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1995).
71. Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1069 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re
Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982).
72. The grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges by a district court is technically at the
discretion of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012) (granting “original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases under [the Bankruptcy Code]”); id. § 157(a) (a “district court may
[refer] any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under [the
Bankruptcy Code] . . . to the bankruptcy judges for the district.” (emphasis added)).
However, most jurisdictions, including every district in Oklahoma, have a standing order
referring cases under the Bankruptcy Code (Title 11) to the district’s bankruptcy judges. See,
e.g., E.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 84.1(a)(1); N.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 84.1(a)(1); W.D. OKLA. CIV. R.
81.4(a)(1). The district court has appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under Title 11. 28
U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/5

2018]

COMMENTS

709

debtor’s assets.”73 Equally as important, the automatic stay provides a
debtor immediate and self-executing relief against his creditors.74 The
automatic stay gives the debtor “room to breathe” so he can attempt
repayment or reorganization without fear of collection efforts or harassment
by his creditors.75
When an entity files a petition for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 301
(voluntary petition), § 302 (joint petition), or § 303 (involuntary petition), a
“bankruptcy estate” is created.76 The estate consists, in part, of the legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property before the commencement of
the bankruptcy.77 The automatic stay generally exists to protect the
bankruptcy estate for the good of both the debtor and its creditors.78 Most
notably, the automatic stay prevents the commencement or continuation of
a judicial action against the debtor that could have been brought prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy,79 the enforcement of a judgment
rendered prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy,80 and “any act to
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or
to exercise control over property of the estate.”81 Accordingly, the
automatic stay represents an incredibly powerful tool with important
implications for parties in interest in a bankruptcy.
To enforce the automatic stay, a court “may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate.”82 Furthermore, a court may—
when the debtor suffers an injury by a willful violation of the stay—order
recovery of actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and (in
appropriate circumstances) punitive damages.83 As soon as a creditor
becomes aware of the debtor’s bankruptcy (and the resulting automatic
stay), “any intentional act that results in a violation of the stay is ‘willful,’”

73. Dean, 72 F.3d at 755–56.
74. Id. at 755.
75. Id.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
77. Id. § 541(a)(1). While the statute lists five other interests that form the bankruptcy
estate, none are relevant here. Additionally, none of the exceptions listed in subsection (b)
are relevant.
78. See id. §§ 362(a)(1)–(6). Each provision specifically concerns the bankruptcy estate.
79. Id. § 362(a)(1).
80. Id. § 362(a)(2).
81. Id. § 362(a)(3). The automatic stay also contemplates several other potential actions
by creditors, but subsections (a)(1)–(3) are the most pertinent to the present issue.
82. Id. § 105(a).
83. Id. § 362(k)(1).
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and “[n]o specific intent to violate the stay or malice is required.”84
Furthermore, a debtor in bankruptcy has no obligation to notify his creditors
of the existence of the stay.85
To avoid a willful or negligent violation of the stay, a creditor should be
aware of the duration of the automatic stay, governed by 11 U.S.C. §
362(c). This section, in part, provides that “a stay of an act against property
of the estate expires when the property is no longer property of the
estate.”86 The stay can also end when (1) the bankruptcy is closed, (2) the
bankruptcy is dismissed, or (3) the debtor receives or is denied a
discharge.87 The stay may also be modified, suspended, or terminated by
the court on request of a creditor or a “party in interest.”88
The automatic stay is a complex and intricate legal infrastructure. Its
several interworking parts create a massive web of protections for debtors,
creditors, and the property of the estate itself. As evidenced by the strict
rules and sanctions accompanying a violation of the stay,89 this two-way
shield should not be trifled with lightly. Therefore, it is extremely important
that any party or creditor interacting with a debtor in bankruptcy understand
the automatic stay, its exceptions, and its reach.
III. The Tests
As discussed in Part I, forced poolings are judicial proceedings that seek
to control property that may fall within the bankruptcy estate. Furthermore,
as discussed in Part II, the continuation or commencement of any such
judicial proceeding should be automatically stayed under 11 U.S.C. §
362(a). Therefore, absent some exception, a forced pooling would violate
the protections afforded to a debtor by the automatic stay.
The “commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit . . . to enforce such governmental unit’s police and
regulatory power” is excepted from the automatic stay. 90 This exception is
84. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 69, ¶ 362.12[3].
85. Id. ¶ 362.12.
86. Id. ¶ 362.06.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(A)–(C).
88. Id. § 362(d).
89. See id. § 362(k)(1).
90. Id. § 362(b)(4). This exception also includes organizations “exercising authority
under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.” Id. This clause is not pertinent to this
analysis as it relates to the Corporation Commission. Additionally, the enforcement of the
governmental unit’s power includes “the enforcement of a judgment other than a money
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termed the “police power exception.”91 The purpose of the police power
exception is detailed in its legislative history:
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions
and proceedings by governmental units to enforce police or
regulatory powers. Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a
debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental
protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of
such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the
automatic stay.92
The safety offered by the bankruptcy court is not meant to be “a haven for
wrongdoers.”93 Thus, this section arises out of the need to continue
regulatory, police, and criminal actions despite the automatic stay.94 The
exception even goes so far as to allow the enforcement of judgments or
orders, other than money judgments.95
While the exception “is intended to be given a narrow construction in
order to permit governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public
health and safety,”96 the exception is not “limited to those situations where
‘imminent and identifiable harm’ to the public health and safety or ‘urgent
public necessity’ is shown.”97 So, although the exception itself is “limited,”
its application indicates the exception is “construed broadly so as not to
override state laws enacted to protect some public interest.”98
To determine whether a proceeding falls within the police power
exception, “courts have applied two ‘related and somewhat overlapping’
tests: the pecuniary purpose test and the public policy test.”99 “In order for
judgment.” Id. Because forced poolings are not “money judgments,” this clause is also
irrelevant to the present discussion. The Corporation Commission falls under the statutory
definition of a “governmental unit.” Id. § 101(27).
91. In re Halo Wireless, Inc., 684 F.3d 581, 588 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Yellow Cab
Coop. Ass’n, 132 F.3d 591, 598 (10th Cir. 1997).
92. In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1182–83 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838).
93. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 69, ¶ 362.05[5][a].
94. Id.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
96. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d at 1184 n.7 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. H11089
(1978))).
97. Id. at 1184.
98. Id.
99. In re Halo Wireless, Inc., 684 F.3d 581, 588 (5th Cir. 2012); see also In re Yellow
Cab Coop. Ass’n, 132 F.3d 591, 597 (10th Cir. 1997); Eddleman v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 923
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the police powers exception to apply, an action by the state must satisfy one
of these tests.”100
The pecuniary purpose test asks whether the proceeding in question
seeks primarily to further or protect the government’s pecuniary interest in
the property of the estate as opposed to promoting public policy.101 If the
purpose of the proceeding is to protect a pecuniary interest, then the
exception does not apply and the proceeding would be automatically
stayed.102 If, however, the proceeding promotes public policy and welfare,
then the exception would apply and the proceeding would not be stayed,
regardless of any purported or real governmental pecuniary interest in any
property in the estate.103
In addition to the pecuniary purpose test, the Circuits have also applied
the public policy test, asking whether the governmental unit is “effectuating
public policy” as opposed to adjudicating private rights.104 If the proceeding
primarily serves to promote public policy, then the exception applies.105 If,
however, the proceeding primarily seeks to adjudicate or advance the
private rights of individuals, then the exception does not apply and the
proceeding in question would be stayed.106 Understanding the two tests
requires exploration of three recent cases applying the police power
exception in the Tenth and Fifth Circuits: In re Halo Wireless, Inc.,107
Eddleman v. United States Department of Labor,108 and In re Yellow Cab
Cooperative Ass’n.109
A. In re Halo Wireless, Inc.
The most recent application of the police power exception by the Fifth
Circuit occurred in the 2012 case In re Halo Wireless, Inc.110 In Halo
Wireless, various local telephone companies brought actions against a
debtor corporation before several states’ Public Utility Commissions
F.2d 782, 791 (10th Cir. 1991), overruling recognized by Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 1031
(10th Cir. 2013).
100. In re Pollock, 402 B.R. 534, 536 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2009).
101. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791.
102. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791.
103. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791.
104. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791.
105. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791.
106. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791.
107. 684 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2012).
108. 923 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1991).
109. 132 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 1997).
110. 684 F.3d 581.
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(PUCs) to recover fees owed to them under applicable state and agency
laws governing telecommunications.111 The debtor, Halo Wireless, Inc.,
was a small telecommunications company claiming to provide wireless
phone and data services112 pursuant to its license from the Federal
Communications Commission.113 The dispute before the PUCs focused on
the “type of service Halo actually provide[d], and whether or not Halo . . .
properly compensate[ed] local companies for the call traffic [Halo]
transfer[red] to them.”114 Because of the number of suits filed against it
before the PUCs, Halo filed for bankruptcy.115 The various
telecommunications companies filed motions requesting an exemption from
the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4).116 The bankruptcy court ruled the
PUC proceedings were excepted; Halo appealed directly to the Fifth
Circuit.117
Before applying the tests, the court contemplated the meaning of
“continued by” in the police power exception.118 Halo argued the PUC
proceedings should not be excepted because the actions were each brought
by individual, private companies and not the government itself.119 Halo
interpreted the police power exception to require an action be “prosecuted
by and in the name of a governmental unit.”120 However, the court found
the statutory language not only excepts the “commencement,” but also the
“continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit.”121 This,
the court reasoned, indicated the statute also excepts actions before a
governmental unit, “without regard to who initially filed the complaint.122
111. Id. at 585.
112. Halo claimed to provide wireless Commercial Mobile Radio Service defined by §
332(d)(1) of the Federal Telecommunications Act. Id. at 584.
113. Id. at 584-85.
114. Id. at 585.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. Although the district court would typically have appellate jurisdiction over the
action before the bankruptcy court per 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the bankruptcy court certified the
appeal directly to the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 585-86. This decision is permitted by §
158(d)(2)(A)(i): “[T]he judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law as to which
there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of the Supreme Court
of the United States, or involves a matter of public importance.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i)
(2012).
118. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588-89.
119. Id. at 588.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 589 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(4) (2012)).
122. Id. at 592.
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The Fifth Circuit held the PUC proceedings passed the pecuniary interest
test because the proceedings did not protect a government pecuniary
interest in Halo’s bankruptcy estate.123 The court equated a government
protecting its pecuniary interest to the government seeking access to
property within the bankruptcy estate.124 Because the police power
exception bars the entry of money judgments against a debtor, the court
reasoned, the PUCs could not enforce any money judgment against Halo
without going through the bankruptcy court.125 The PUCs, therefore, could
not gain access to Halo’s property.126 As such, the court held the PUC
proceedings passed the pecuniary purpose test under the police power
exception and were not subject to the automatic stay.127
The court also held the PUC proceedings were aimed at effectuating
public policy and, therefore, satisfied the public policy test.128 The court
reasoned there was an obvious public policy component to the state and
federal
regulation
of
telecommunications.129
The
Federal
Telecommunications Act (FTA) was passed, in part, to prevent
discrimination in the availability of telecommunications.130 The FTA, the
court found, “contemplate[d] a public purpose to state regulation of
telecommunications,” and indicated that the “regulation of
telecommunications carriers serves the public interest.”131 Furthermore, the
court determined the statutory and common law surrounding PUCs
“demonstrate[d] their public purpose.”132 Finally, although a proceeding
adjudicating private rights fails the public policy test, the court remained
unconcerned that the proceedings were initiated by private companies over
private contracts.133 Thus, the public policy nature of the PUC proceedings
was strong enough to except those proceedings from the automatic stay.134

123. Id. at 593.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 594.
126. Id. at 593.
127. Id. at 595.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 594.
130. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
131. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 594.
132. Id. (citing May Dep’t Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 107 S.W.2d 41
(Mo. 1937); Campaign for a Prosperous Ga. v. Ga. Power Co., 174 329 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. Ct.
App.1985); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 52.001(a) (1997)).
133. See id. at 592.
134. See id. at 595.
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B. Eddleman v. United States Department of Labor
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit addressed the police power exception in
Eddleman v. United States Department of Labor.135 The Eddlemans, owners
of a mail-hauling business working under contract for the United States
Postal Service, filed a § 301 petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.136 The U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) filed an action against the Eddlemans,
claiming violations of the Service Contract Act (SCA).137 The DOL alleged
the Eddlemans, prior to petitioning for bankruptcy, failed to pay workers
adequate wages and keep proper records of hours worked and wages
paid.138 Pursuant to the SCA, the DOL filed an administrative enforcement
action for back wages and inclusion of the Eddlemans on the SCA violator
list.139 Believing the DOL had violated the automatic stay, the Eddlemans
filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court seeking enforcement
of the stay against the DOL action.140 The Eddlemans also sought damages
for the alleged willful violation of the automatic stay.141 The DOL moved to
dismiss the adversary proceeding, claiming it was acting within its police
and regulatory powers in accordance with § 362(b)(4).142 The bankruptcy
court denied the motion, and the district court affirmed the decision.143 The
DOL appealed to the Tenth Circuit.144
The Tenth Circuit concluded the enforcement proceedings passed the
pecuniary purpose test because the “remedies sought by the DOL [were]
not designed to advance the government’s pecuniary interest.”145 Seeking

135. 923 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1991), overruling recognized by Rajala v. Gardner, 709
F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2013). Rajala’s discussion of Eddleman was limited to the appellate
jurisdiction of the court and did not discuss the Eddleman court’s application of the
pecuniary purpose and public policy tests. Rajala, 709 F.3d at 1034–35.
136. Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 783.
137. Id. The Service Contract Act, codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 6701–6707, requires federal
contractors to pay statutory minimum wages and fringe benefits and maintain certain
working conditions. 41 U.S.C. § 6703 (2012). A violation of the SCA renders the
responsible party liable for back pay to the employees, the cancellation of the government
contract, inclusion on a list of SCA violators, and a three-year prohibition from contracting
with the government. Id. §§ 6705–6706.
138. Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 783.
139. Id.; 41 U.S.C. §§ 6705–6707.
140. Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 783.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 791.
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liquidation of back-pay claims, the court reasoned, would not give the DOL
access to the Eddlemans’ bankruptcy estate.146 Rather, the primary purpose
of the DOL’s ability to pursue the statutory damages was to “prevent unfair
competition in the market by companies who pay substandard wages.”147
The police power exception, therefore, applied and the action was excepted
from the automatic stay.148
The court also determined the remedies sought neither advanced nor
adjudicated private rights and thus, passed the public policy test.149 The
court reasoned that, even though the DOL sought liquidation of back-pay
claims for individuals, the DOL, in bringing the suit, was not advancing
private rights.150 The court’s opinion was strengthened by the knowledge
that any of the back-pay claimants would not be able to enforce their money
judgment absent the normal bankruptcy procedures.151 In fact, the claims
for the individuals, the court held, were an acceptable way to enforce the
policies of the SCA.152 These public policies far outweighed any
adjudication of private rights, thereby satisfying the public policy test as
well.153
C. In re Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n
In a later decision, the Tenth Circuit again applied the police power
exception in In re Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n.154 Yellow Cab, a certified
taxi company in Colorado, filed a § 301 petition for a Chapter 11
bankruptcy.155 The bankruptcy court authorized Yellow Cab, in an effort to
pay Yellow Cab’s creditors, to sell its assets to Taxi Associates, Inc.156 One
of Yellow Cab’s assets was its Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity (CPCN) authorizing Yellow Cab to operate up to 600 taxis in
Denver.157 Yellow Cab, however, had only operated 300 cabs for several
years.158 Because the sale to Taxi Associates, Inc. involved a CPCN (issued
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
132 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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by the Colorado PUC), the bankruptcy court required Yellow Cab to
request the PUC’s approval of the transfer.159 In its “Transfer Decision,” the
PUC denied the application for transfer of the full certificate because “the
unused authority under the CPCN had become dormant” and nontransferable, citing concerns over competition and public interest.160 Yellow
Cab initiated an adversary proceeding against the PUC to enjoin the PUC
from blocking the transfer of the full 600-cab authority under the CPCN.161
The bankruptcy court issued the injunction, holding the decision to limit the
CPCN impermissibly controlled the property of the bankruptcy estate in
violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).162 The PUC appealed and the district
court overturned the injunction, citing the police power exception.163
Yellow Cab appealed to the Tenth Circuit.164
The Tenth Circuit held, following a very brief analysis, that the Transfer
Decision passed the pecuniary purpose test.165 The court went no further
than to say the Transfer Decision effectuated public policy and was,
therefore, excepted from the stay.166 The court did not discuss the PUC’s
lack of pecuniary interest in denying the full transfer at all, focusing instead
on the public policy reasons behind the PUC’s Transfer Decision.167
According to the PUC’s Transfer Decision, “destructive competition”
would arise out of the unconditional reactivation of the dormant portion of
the CPCN and “approval of the transfer . . . would likely damage other
carriers and the public interest.”168 The court held the PUC’s action
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 593-94.
162. Id. at 594 (citing Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Yellow Cab Coop. Ass’n, 194
B.R. 504, 506 (D. Colo. 1996)).
163. Id.
164. Id. A key issue in the case was whether or not the police power exception applied to
actions violating 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (acts to obtain possession or exercise control over the
property of the estate). Id. at 598. This is because the police power exception, as codified in
1997, was separated into subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5) and did not explicitly list subsection
(a)(3) among the actions possibly excepted. See id. at 596 (dictating the actual language of
the police power exception as it existed in 1997). The court found that, although subsection
(a)(3) was not explicitly listed, the police power exception applied to actions stayed under
subsection (a)(3). Id. at 598. Because the language of subsection (b)(4) now includes
subsections (a)(1)–(3), (6), this issue is irrelevant to the analysis and application with regard
to Corporation Commission forced poolings.
165. Id. at 597.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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effectuated public policy and excepted that action from the automatic
stay.169
The court also quickly dispensed with the public policy test, holding the
Transfer Decision easily passed.170 The court used the same analysis for the
pecuniary purpose test in determining that the Transfer Decision passed the
public policy test as well.171 Notably, the court appeared unconcerned that
the PUC action decreased the operating certificate from 600 to 300,
affecting the private rights of both the debtor-seller and the purchaser.172 It
could be argued that the PUC proceeding adjudicated the private rights of
both Yellow Cab and Taxi Associates, Inc. But, from its brief analysis, it
appears the court was more concerned with the public interest factors
behind the Transfer Decision discussed above.173 As such, the court
concluded the Transfer Decision did not primarily serve to adjudicate
private rights and was excepted from the automatic stay.174
D. Application to Corporation Commission Forced Poolings
Based on the three aforementioned cases, pooling proceedings before the
Corporation Commission involving a party in bankruptcy likely pass the
pecuniary purpose test and will be excepted from the automatic stay. This is
because neither the state nor the federal government typically has a
pecuniary interest in the property rights175 involved in the forced pooling.
Much like the PUC proceedings in Halo Wireless, the DOL suit in
Eddleman, and the PUC proceeding in Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n,
forced poolings neither give the Corporation Commission access to the
estate’s property nor further the government’s pecuniary interest. The
pecuniary purpose test is thus easily dispensed with as it relates to forced
poolings.
And, based on the three cases discussed above, forced poolings likely
pass the public policy test and will be excepted from the stay. A court
would likely find that the public policy underlying a forced pooling
outweighs any private rights adjudicated in the process. The goal of a
forced pooling (and any conservation proceeding) after all, is to prevent
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Those property rights being the various rights in privately owned mineral estates,
that is, a working interest or a royalty interest.
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waste, protect correlative rights, prevent pollution, and maximize
hydrocarbon recovery.176 The purpose of the proceeding is to promote
public policy and protect public welfare. This remains true regardless of
whether or not a working interest owner is involved in a pending
bankruptcy.
Halo Wireless provides particularly useful insight in assessing how a
court would rule on this issue because it involved third parties bringing
administrative actions against a bankrupt party before a state agency. This
parallels a working interest owner attempting to pool another working
interest owner in the same unit despite the latter’s bankrupt status. A strong
argument can be made that a meaningful difference exists between local
telephone companies seeking relief from the state PUC for a debtor’s
violation of agency law and an individual or corporation attempting to drill
an oil well. A court could decide that the conservation proceedings merely
adjudicate private rights under the guise of protecting public policy. It
seems more likely, though, that the furtherance of public policy through the
Corporation Commission will be seen as more important than the
adjudication of private rights.
A parallel can also be drawn between the limitation of the CPCN in
Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n and the modification of rights in a bankrupt
party’s mineral estate. The Tenth Circuit was not concerned with the
limitation on the CPCN because of the public policy behind the limitation.
This was the case even though the limitation blatantly affected the value of
the bankruptcy estate in a concrete, measurable way. In contrast, a pooling
does not (at least in theory) actually affect the value of the mineral estate.177
Unlike the limitation on the CPCN, however, a working interest owner
subject to a pooling order does not relinquish his rights for nothing in
return; it is a bargained-for exchange. Therefore, any “effect” on the
bankruptcy estate is not so much a diminution of its value but rather a
metamorphosis of the rights owned in a mineral estate. Because the Tenth
Circuit was not bothered by the diminution of the value of the bankruptcy
estate through the CPCN limitation, it is difficult to imagine that the court
would be troubled by a swap of working interest rights for a royalty
interest.

176. 17 OKLA. STAT. § 57 (2011).
177. A working interest is arguably more “valuable” than a royalty interest because the
owner of the latter is more restricted in his rights. A working interest owner has full right, as
an equal co-tenant, to explore and extract hydrocarbons whereas a royalty interest owner is
limited to his share of any hydrocarbon sales.
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The DOL suit in Eddleman bears little resemblance to a forced pooling,
but an important lesson remains: the DOL filing the lawsuit on behalf of
individuals did not run afoul of the public policy test. While the DOL
sought liquidated claims for wages owed (asking the court to adjudicate
private rights), the public policy allowing the DOL to do so far outweighed
the private rights adjudicated. Similarly, the Corporation Commission
would be asked, in a forced pooling, to adjudicate the private rights of the
applicant, the working interest owner in bankruptcy, and every other
working interest owner in the unit. The question then becomes whether the
private rights of the individuals involved in a pooling outweigh the public
policy underlying forced poolings.
IV. The Police Power Exception in the Tenth and Fifth Circuits
Because the three exemplary cases do not provide a sufficiently broad
spectrum to determine the importance of private rights versus public policy,
it becomes necessary to explore other Tenth and Fifth Circuit cases
applying the police power exception. One particularly helpful line of cases
deals with similar administrative proceedings conducted within the
government agency itself. A comparison of these cases to forced pooling
proceedings before the Corporation Commission provides additional
examples of administrative agencies exercising their police powers while
seemingly adjudicating private rights. Another informative set of cases
deals with parties and attorneys (individuals) seeking Rule 11 sanctions
against debtors. These actions, on their face, appear to be the adjudication
of private rights and help to further clarify when public policy is adjudged
to outweigh the private rights adjudicated.
A. Administrative Proceedings
Several administrative agencies act in a quasi-judicial capacity when
they hear disputes between private parties that arise under the agencies’
regulatory schemes.178 Some administrative proceedings begin just like an
ordinary lawsuit: an aggrieved party files a complaint with the
administrative agency against another party, asking the agency to take some
action against the latter.179 While these administrative proceedings seem to
178. See, e.g., In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, No. 11-07-10138 MA, 2008
WL 1733601 (Bankr. D.N.M. Apr. 10, 2008); In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co., 12 B.R. 917
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
179. Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 2008 WL 1733601 at *1; Dan Hixson
Chevrolet Co., 12 B.R. at 919.
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adjudicate private rights, there are instances where the public policy
component of the proceeding outweighs any private rights involved.180 In
those cases, the proceedings would be excepted from the automatic stay if
the defending party enters bankruptcy.181 But if the agency is serving solely
in a quasi-judicial capacity to adjudicate private rights without reference to
public policy, those proceedings are not excepted and should be stayed.182
In In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for
the District of New Mexico considered whether a proceeding against a
debtor in bankruptcy before the state Human Rights Commission (HRC)
violated the automatic stay.183 One of the debtor’s former employees,
Hollinger, filed a complaint with the HRC alleging a violation of the state’s
Human Rights Act.184 After settlement negotiations failed, the HRC held a
proceeding against the debtor, finding in favor of Hollinger and awarding
her compensatory damages.185 The debtor believed the proceeding before
the HRC violated the automatic stay.186 Furthermore, the debtor argued the
proceeding was not excepted by § 362(b)(4) because the proceeding was
initiated by a private party and resulted in monetary damages, therefore
advancing Hollinger’s private rights.187 The court disagreed, even though
Hollinger was “the direct beneficiary” of the proceeding, because the public
policy of preventing and deterring discriminatory practices in the workplace
outweighed the private rights adjudicated.188 The court concluded,
therefore, that the proceeding clearly passed the public policy test and was
excepted from the automatic stay.189
In In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co., Volkswagen of America, Inc. sought
to terminate its franchise agreement with a franchisee when the franchisee
entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy.190 To terminate the agreement, Volkswagen
first notified the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission (“Commission”).191
Volkswagen sought relief from the automatic stay so the Commission could
180. Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 2008 WL 1733601 at *3; Dan Hixson
Chevrolet Co., 12 B.R. at 922.
181. Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 2008 WL 1733601 at *3.
182. Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co., 12 B.R. at 922.
183. Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 2008 WL 1733601 at *1.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at *2.
188. Id. at *3.
189. Id.
190. 12 B.R. 917, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
191. Id.
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rule on whether the franchise agreement should be terminated, arguing that
the Commission proceeding fell under the police power exception.192 The
bankruptcy judge first examined the nature of the Commission, finding that
the Texas Motor Vehicle Code and the creation of the Commission itself
were both proper exercises of the state’s police and regulatory powers.193
The court next considered whether “every action or proceeding taken by or
before the [Commission] is ‘to enforce its police or regulatory power,’
within the meaning of § 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.”194 The court
rejected this view, finding the mere creation of an agency or governmental
entity through the state’s proper exercise of its police powers does not
inherently mean the agency is always exempted from the automatic stay. 195
In fact, the court reasoned that a different construction would render the
automatic stay meaningless.196
The court determined that whether an agency proceeding will be
excepted depends on the nature of that agency’s power.197 If the agency acts
in an executive capacity—exercising its police powers—then that action
will be excepted.198 If, however, the agency acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity—adjudicating private rights and not effectuating public policy—
that action will not be excepted from the automatic stay.199 The court
concluded that because the hearing affected only the parties involved and
not the public as a whole, the Commission was acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity by adjudicating the private rights of Volkswagen and the
franchisee.200 Therefore, the court declined to exempt the Commission
proceeding from the stay.201

192. Id. at 918–19.
193. Id. at 919.
194. Id. at 920 (emphasis added). The court quoted the relevant section of the Texas
Motor Vehicle Code in finding the public policy behind the Commission. Id. at 919.
Notably, the quoted statute explained that the sale of new motor vehicles “vitally affects the
general economy of the State and the public interest and welfare of its citizens,” and that the
“purpose of this Act [is] to exercise the State’s police power.” Id. (citation to the Texas
Motor Vehicle Code omitted).
195. Id. at 920.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 921.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 922.
201. Id.
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B. Rule 11 Sanctions
A proceeding for Rule 11 sanctions appears to adjudicate the private
rights of two different parties. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 lists some
of an attorney’s duties and responsibilities to the court and to his client.202
In addition to these responsibilities, Rule 11 provides that a court, either on
its own volition or on motion from an opposing party, may issue sanctions
for violating the responsibilities imposed by the rule.203 When an opposing
party files a motion for Rule 11 sanctions, that dispute is seemingly
between two private parties. However, as the Northern District of
Oklahoma held in Maritan v. Todd,204 the public policy behind an
adjudication for Rule 11 sanctions outweighs any private rights
adjudicated.205
In Maritan, a magistrate judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma
considered whether an appeal arising out of Rule 11 sanctions was
automatically stayed when the lawyer subject to the sanctions was a debtor
in bankruptcy.206 The party seeking the sanctions (appellant) argued that
proceedings for Rule 11 sanctions fall under the police power exception
because of the regulatory purpose of the proceedings.207 Citing a Seventh
Circuit opinion, the court reasoned that Rule 11 sanctions incorporate a
strong public policy component extending beyond mere fee shifting.208 Rule
11, the court explained, imposes sanctions on lawyers as punishment for
unprofessional conduct during the course of litigation, not necessarily to
reduce the costs of the prevailing party.209 The court found that parties
seeking Rule 11 sanctions are “private attorney[s] general,” acting as agents
of the federal judiciary to punish unprofessional behavior in litigation.210
This, the court decided, was true despite the fact that sanctions could be
wholly pecuniary.211 Even though proceedings for sanctions deal with
private rights, the purpose “is not an attempt to settle private rights.”212
Instead, “the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is aimed at effectuating the
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a), (b).
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
203 B.R. 740 (N.D. Okla. 1996).
See id. at 744.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 742.
Id. (quoting Alpern v. Lieb, 11 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Id. (quoting Alpern, 11 F.3d at 690).
Id. (quoting Alpern, 11 F.3d at 690).
Id. (quoting Alpern, 11 F.3d at 690).
Id. at 744.
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federal judiciary’s policy of purging needless, harassing, and abusive
litigation from the federal court system.”213 Because of the overwhelming
public policy concerns involved, the court held that the proceedings for
Rule 11 sanctions passed the public policy test and were excepted from the
automatic stay.214
C. Application to Corporation Commission Forced Poolings
Analysis of the police power exception as it relates to other
administrative proceedings and proceedings for Rule 11 sanctions leads to
the conclusion that forced poolings should be excepted from the automatic
stay. As In re Aerobox and Maritan show, even proceedings that seemingly
adjudicate private rights can satisfy the public policy test and be excepted
from the automatic stay. And, just like in In re Aerobox, even though the
working interest owner seeking to operate a well by means of a pooling
order is arguably the direct beneficiary of the pooling, the primary purpose
behind the pooling order remains the effectuation of public policy.
Furthermore, even though the private interests involved in a forced pooling
are entirely pecuniary, like proceedings for Rule 11 sanctions in Maritan,
the public policy considerations behind pooling orders arguably outweigh
the private rights adjudicated.
Despite all this, In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co. gives rise to several
questions about the true nature of pooling proceedings. Much like the Texas
Motor Vehicle Code, the statutes detailing the duties and obligations of the
Corporation Commission set forth strong public policy considerations. As
the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas found, however,
the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission proceedings actually adjudicate
disputes between private parties to discern each party’s respective rights.
Similarly, a pooling proceeding is merely an administrative construct that
modifies the rights of an individual’s mineral estate (transforming a
working interest to a royalty interest with cash compensation). Furthermore,
the bankruptcy judge in Dan Hixson Chevrolet determined that, because the
Texas Motor Vehicle Commission proceeding would only affect the parties
involved in the proceeding, the agency was acting in a quasi-sovereign
capacity even though there were strong public policy considerations behind
the proceeding. This mirrors pooling proceedings, where the only rights
modified by a pooling order are those of the parties involved in the
proceeding.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 742.
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Although the concerns arising from Dan Hixson Chevrolet cast some
doubt on the public policy nature of the pooling proceedings, the balance
between private rights and public policy tips in favor of the latter. Because
pooling proceedings effectuate public policy more than they adjudicate
private rights, pooling proceedings should be excepted from the automatic
stay.
V. Conclusions and Recommendation
Forced poolings implicate the automatic stay and check most, if not all,
of the boxes necessary to warrant application of the police power exception.
Primarily, a debtor’s unleased working interest in a mineral estate forms
part of the bankruptcy estate created by 11 U.S.C. § 541.215 Therefore, the
commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding to obtain
possession of or exercise control over a debtor’s working interest triggers
the automatic stay.216 A forced pooling is clearly a judicial proceeding that
seeks to exercise control over a mineral estate’s working interest.
Accordingly, unless the police power exception applies, pooling
proceedings must be stayed.
A forced pooling likely triggers the police power exception, though, and
exempts the proceedings from the automatic stay. First, a forced pooling is
clearly a proceeding by a government entity.217 Second, there are strong
public policy concerns associated with not only forced poolings but all
conservation proceedings before the Corporation Commission.218 Third, the
Corporation Commission holds no pecuniary interest in a forced pooling—
the purpose of the proceeding is merely to allow a willing operator the
ability to drill a well in an established spacing unit.219 Thus, the only
characteristic of a forced pooling that could prevent the application of the
police power exception is the nature of the rights adjudicated.
The pecuniary purpose test presents an easy enough hurdle to clear: the
state of Oklahoma and the Corporation Commission have no pecuniary
interest in a debtor working interest owner’s bankruptcy estate. Nothing in a
forced pooling suggests Oklahoma or the Corporation Commission is
motivated by a desire to control the bankruptcy estate for its own gain. It is
215. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). It is important that the mineral interest be unleased; a
transferred working interest in gaseous hydrocarbons is not included in the bankruptcy
estate. Id. § 541(b)(4)(A)(i).
216. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), (3) (2012).
217. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2012).
218. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-1-1 (2016).
219. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (2011).
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a safe assumption, therefore, that forced poolings satisfy the pecuniary
purpose test.
The public policy test, however, is less clear regarding the fate of forced
poolings. The stated purpose of the oil and gas division of the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission is to maximize recovery, prevent waste, and
protect correlative rights; undoubtedly, these are public policy
considerations.220 It cannot be ignored, however, that forced poolings are,
for all intents and purposes, adjudications of private rights. Any private
citizen, publicly traded company, or partnership that owns a working
interest in a mineral estate retains the ability and the right to petition the
Corporation Commission to let them drill and operate a well within their
unit. Yes, drilling the well maximizes recovery. Yes, it is unfair to allow the
inability to reach a private agreement or a holdout working interest owner
to chill the recovery of hydrocarbons. But do those public policy interests
outweigh the highly individualized nature of these conservation
proceedings? Forced poolings unquestionably involve the adjudication of
private rights. The question, then, is which is more important: the public
policy goals of the forced pooling or the private rights? Given the
importance of oil and gas exploration to the state of Oklahoma, it is fair to
presume that most would conclude the public benefits of pooling and
drilling far outweigh any individual rights adjudicated in the process.
The cynical answer to this question is that whether forced poolings fall
under the police power exception may prove inconsequential. While
bankruptcies for oil and gas producers occur with increasing frequency,221
the relatively short nature of bankruptcies in the oil and gas industry could
render the question moot time and again. Take, for example, SandRidge.
SandRidge filed for bankruptcy on May 16, 2016.222 A mere twenty weeks
later, on October 4, 2016, SandRidge emerged from its bankruptcy.223 In the
grand scheme of oil and gas exploration, twenty weeks is no time at all. It is
possible that a working interest owner in bankruptcy could emerge from
that bankruptcy fast enough that the Corporation Commission need not
220. There is even an environmental protection argument to be made in support of the
public policy behind forced poolings and the application of the police power exception.
221. OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR, supra note 8, at 2.
222. In re SandRidge Energy Inc., No. 16-32488 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 16, 2016); Erin
Ailworth & Stephanie Gleason, SandRidge Energy Files for Bankruptcy Protection, WALL
ST. J. (May 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sandridge-energy-files-for-bankruptcyprotection-1463404621.
223. Adam Wilmoth, SandRidge Energy Emerges from Bankruptcy, OKLAHOMAN (Oct.
4, 2016), http://newsok.com/article/5520992.
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worry about whether forced poolings must be stayed. It is also possible that
a working interest owner in bankruptcy, probably an individual, would not
object to being pooled and would have no reason to ask the Corporation
Commission to enforce the automatic stay.
When the debtor is a corporation, it is easier to justify the adjudication of
private rights with “promoting public policy.” In that sense, the Corporation
Commission’s conclusions regarding Linn Energy, discussed in the
Introduction, seem justified. Linn Energy is a sophisticated and complex
corporate entity with billions of dollars in assets and liabilities. Whether
one of Linn Energy’s subsidiaries operates a single well in Oklahoma
seems less like the adjudication of private rights. In Linn Energy’s case, it
seems far more important that a viable company take over operation of the
wells in question to maximize recovery and prevent waste.
Consider, however, how the exception might affect an individual or
married couple that files a voluntary or joint petition to enter bankruptcy.
Perhaps Bob and Jane Smith own working interests in various units
throughout the state. Maybe they even have the financial means and
contractual savvy to negotiate a JOA with the other working interest owners
in their units. Maybe they have every intention of holding onto their
working interests and have a chance of keeping them when they emerge
from bankruptcy. Even if the Smiths cannot emerge from bankruptcy with
their working interests intact, the Smiths’ bankruptcy estate is concretely
affected by changing the working interest into a pure royalty interest. A
pooling order devalues the Smiths’ bankruptcy estate and prevents the
Smiths from paying their creditors as much as they could have when they
still owned their working interest. Thus, pooling proceedings seem much
more like an adjudication of private rights when they involve individuals
that own working interests in units. More likely than not, however, the
Smiths simply do not exist.
Although this question may continuously be rendered moot, a chance
exists, given the immeasurable number of working interest owners in the
state and the number of well operators registered with the Corporation
Commission, that some individual (as opposed to a corporate) working
interest owner somewhere could remain in bankruptcy long enough to be a
party to a forced pooling. Because of this possibility, the Corporation
Commission should consider how to treat individual working interest
owners in bankruptcy. Specifically, the Corporation Commission should
consider whether the public policy component of pooling proceedings
outweighs the private rights adjudicated when the working interest owner is
an individual debtor in bankruptcy. The Corporation Commission’s
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decision that pooling proceedings involving a bankrupt corporate working
interest owner are exempt from the stay through the police power exception
makes perfect sense. Perhaps, however, an argument can be made to halt a
forced pooling when the debtor is an individual. With any luck, a
sophisticated, individual working interest owner in bankruptcy will choose
to contest and appeal a pooling order, allowing a court to finally answer this
question. The court could then thoroughly analyze whether the public
policy considerations outweigh the private rights of the individual. Until
such a time, bankrupt beware: your working interest can still be pooled.
Connor R. Bourland
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